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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 20 May 1972

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



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Enemy Activity

The North Vietnamese offensive made no significant headway during the week, although the Communists remained active in all four Military Regions of South Vietnam. The enemy continued his preparations for attacks against Hue in the north and Kontum in the central highlands, and he maintained his pressure -- though at somewhat diminished levels -- on An Loc in MR 3. Action also picked up in the western part of the Delta as the North Vietnamese attempted to move more troops from Cambodia into Kien Giang Province. South Vietnamese counterattacks and defensive efforts, coupled with effective artillery and air support, have inflicted substantial casualties on the enemy and appear to have disrupted his timetable in all major battle areas. In the area north of Hue, the enemy's attacks of the past few days have at least in part been efforts to preempt planned ARVN counterthrusts, rather than the beginning of an all-out attack on that city. Nevertheless, further large-scale Communist attacks are possible at any time in each Military Region, although the particularly heavy losses which the enemy has suffered around An Loc suggest that his offensive in this area may have passed its peak.

In Cambodia, enemy activity was light throughout the week. The Communists continued their month-old campaign to extend their control over the southeastern border area in order to secure infiltration corridors into the Delta of South Vietnam. Enemy logistics movements into this area have increased, and as noted above, some elements of the Phuoc Long Front have already moved across into South Vietnam. In northwest Cambodia, government forces have made some additional progress in their four-month-old clearing operation around the Angkor Wat Temple complex. FANK units in the area have been augmented and ordered to retake the ruins at "all costs." Enemy forces around Angkor Wat are relatively weak, and Lon Nol clearly wishes to gain a military success here which could be publicized before the Cambodian presidential election scheduled for 4 June.

In Jaos, only light contacts occurred near Long Tieng as friendly forces consolidated their positions in the Sam Thong area. To the south in the Lao Panhandle, friendly forces were unsuccessful in their initial attempts to clear the Dong Hene area and to retake Khong Sedone, which the enemy had captured at midweek. In the far northwest, analysis of recent photography indicates that all of the Chinese Communist built road network was in good condition as of late April, with the road leading toward Thailand motorable to within three kilometers of the Mekong.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The acceptance of 1,615 NVA personnel during the week brings the estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to some 115,800 - 117,800. In addition to personnel in the infiltration pipeline, it now appears that the remaining elements of the 325th NVA Division may be preparing to move across the DMZ to join one of the Division's regiments which had already moved into Quang Tri Province. The movement of most of the 312th NVA Division from north Laos back into North Vietnam suggests that this unit will replace the 325th as North Vietnam's strategic reserve, allowing the deployment of the latter to the south.

The North Vietnamese are continuing to ship substantial volumes of supplies southward to the battlefronts. A heavy flow of material has been noted moving through the DMZ, from Laos into MR l and the central highlands, and through Cambodia toward COSVN's areas of operations. At the same time, the Communists are apparently maintaining substantial stockpiles in rear areas of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. To handle this flow, the North Vietnamese have continued to relocate and reorganize major logistics authorities as well as to prepare for operations into the rainy season.

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